During the multifaceted crisis that has befallen Zimbabwe since 2000 the plight of the people has been manifest in a shrinking employment market, triple or four digit inflation, a sometime dearth of available commodities, rising child mortality rates and falling life expectancy -to the worst female life expectancy in the world -and a governance crisis experienced as political violence, uncertainty and cultural and social isolationism. Many popular and academic papers have bemoaned and discussed these symptoms of crisis.
Introduction
"We just pray our children will not be repatriated back because life is very rough here." (2006) "Things are so hard that we are now leading an abnormal kind of life. It was unheard of during our days that a woman would spend most of her time in a foreign country working for the family. It is unfortunate that we are gradually losing our manhood, even the very kind of respect we used to get as husbands. " (2006) "Our life requires supplementary assistance otherwise we cannot survive as human beings created in the image of God." (2006) 
"Money received from abroad is no longer useful when compared to the cost of living in Zimbabwe. The government should promote the informal sector to supplement what we get from our relatives working outside the country." (2006)
Life is getting hard everyday. Had it not been help that we get from the relatives in Diaspora, we would not be here. (2006) "We just feel sorry for our children because they now carry extra burdens. When we grew up, life used to be easy and manageable, but today it's no longer the same." (2006) "I have nothing to add because it makes no difference. Our life has gone beyond our capacity or ability. The haves will continue having more, while the have nots will continue getting poorer and poorer." (2006) That remittances are critical to household wellbeing in Zimbabwe (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2004; Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) and elsewhere has been clearly established by a mature and burgeoning literature (for example, Mutume, 2005) . Indeed, it has become a commonplace in the research area of migration and development, and its subfield of poverty reduction and remittance studies, that international migration can have a positive impact on poverty reduction through the generation of migrant remittances (Skeldon, 1997 (Skeldon, , 2002 Kothari, 2002; De Haas, 2005; Adams and Page, 2005 ; Department for International Developent (DfID), 2007), and, for the vast majority of researchers, that remittances are positively associated with economic growth (see Adams and Page, 2005) . Within international development, much hope has been invested that remittances provide an accessible pathway out of poverty, and an alternative to inter-governmental and official systems of development assistance (IOM, 2007) .
This generally positive view does, however, have strong detractors, particularly over the role remittances can play in exacerbating social and economic inequality (reviewed in Bracking, 2003; Hansen, 2004 on Somalia; Ghosh, 2006) , and given the particular vulnerabilities experienced by remitters themselves (Datta et al, 2006; Akuei, 2005) . Additionally, for sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence of positive developmental impact remains particularly sketchy, if not illustrative (see de Hann, 2000: 17) , partly because of data unavailability, and partly because the results of econometric analysis, such as Adams and Page (2005) , is correspondingly questionable, as it becomes heavily weighted in aggregation to the experience of other regions. However, this working paper does not seek to contribute directly to this wider debate on the contribution of remittances to economic development (from the seminal Stark et al 1986; reviewed in Bracking, 2003; Maimbo and Ratha, 2005) : it is evidentially much more demanding than our small data set can manage. We aim instead to add to the small but growing data on sub-Saharan Africa and Zimbabawe in particular.
Suffice to note that unsubstantiated optimism was generated by widely cited large remittance figures, and an overly positive interpretation of them until quite recently. Large headline figures were considered outside of the context of working economies (see Cohen 2005) , while attribution and aggregation problems in large data sets, such as in Adams and Page (2005) hide the specific circumstances of structurally isolated economies where many of the poorest people live (Gore, 2003) , many of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa (Grant et al, 2004) . In these, we can expect that productive absorption of this type of incoming investment into the formal economy will be much lower (Newland, 2003; Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) , although this too remains under-researched (see De Haas, 2005 : 1274 Khadria, 2002: 25) . Mhone (2001) wrote convincingly of the structural duality and enclave nature of political economies in southern Africa, which again suggests that the productive absorption of remittance incomes here would be questionable and highly contextual. The research here is carried out where all these cautionary factors pertain.
In any case, remittances of goods and money -and skills and services, although these latter are not covered by our research -in their multitude of individual acts of charity and care, add up to a truly global network of transactions (see Zinyama, 2002 on Zimbabwe; Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004) . Networks are particularly difficult to evaluate in any simple cost-benefit type analysis. Remittance networks have their own institutions in the wider sense: context specific and localised firms and internet-based systems, norms and codes of behaviour and shared understandings. Geographers talk of complex and interdependent webs of human behaviour built on remittance sending and receipt (Koser and Al-Ali, 2001; Black and King, 2004) , while Özden and Schiff (2006) reviewed the literature on the effect of these complex networks on the sending societies. The network is symptomatic of peoples' persistent attempt to liberalise movement and the global labour market as a response to both economic crisis and economic opportunity under processes generated by the globalisation of capital, industrial manufacture, and iconic cultural consumption. Within this general response to globalisation, each particular remittance sending community has its own nodal points and social practices which have multiple effects on the society not just left behind but carried along and transformed. How far remittances can affect and underpin transformative social change is core to a number of ongoing research projects. For example, Bailey et al (2008) promise an exploration of the spatiality of the transnational practice of remittance sending and receipt for the Zimbabwean Diaspora living in West Yorkshire, in cognisance of its multifaceted, social, material, cultural, and symbolic meanings (they cite Massey, 2005; Featherstone et al, 2007) .
Our case study illustrates more about basic survival and privatised social protection in a period of economic contraction, which is embedded in our urban suburbs of Zimbabwe, even though our remitters are dispersed globally1. How far our empirics are illustrative of wider processes of social survival, change and meaning remains an open question at the current stage of the work, although some tentative observations have emerged around this theme. The specificity of our research centres on how individuals and households have responded in Zimbabwe to an extended period of economic crisis and retreat by the state into 'spoils politics' (see Allen, 1999) . We have found that optimism surrounding the ability of individuals to build institutions, de facto, if not de jure, in periods of crisis to substitute for those formal sector ones which have been functionally lost, must be tempered by a realistic acknowledgement of the limitations desperate and poor people face during such periods. Instead, an understandable widespread social and cultural implosion occurs in the everyday life of people, which remittances, though acts of solidarity, can only temper, not solve. We discuss some of the methodological challenges of this research in the next section, and return to the wider links with processes of informalisation and malign politics in section 4.
Methodological challenges
This paper reports on a second round of household sampling in the suburbs of Harare and Bulawayo in November 2006, repeating with only minor changes a sampling survey first carried out in those same suburbs in 2005 (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) . Because of security concerns we did not keep a record of the names or addresses of our original 300 households, but instead sampled another 300 in the same districts. Since we have income and demographic data we can match these two samples together and for the purposes of comparison view them as commensurate within measurable margins of error.
The purpose of the second survey was to review changes in migrant remittance sending and receipt statistics, and review the changes since 2005. We wanted to take a particular note of changes which would indicate a higher state of crisis in the economy; increased informalisation of economic activity; the rate of dollarisation in the informal economy; and changes to households' living standards as these relate to receipt of remittances. There was also an objective to review how the various sectors and institutions of the remittance economy; the informal sector money couriers, the internet based money exchangers, the informal commercial companies and cargo carriers had grown or shrunk in relation to their formal sector comparators and to review the basic organisational contours of a parallel economy in the midst of a governance crisis. We had relatively more success with these research objectives, than those, (below), which require extrapolation from our case study data set up to a wider geographic referent, such as the political nation, or the generic case of the role of remittances in ameliorating economic crisis.
There are also a number of other methodological objections of which we are aware2. The first is that this type of quantification add to nothing but an empiricism on which it is impossible to build theoretical concepts and categories; that the 'scaling up' problem is particularly acute in this case as Zimbabwe is seen as sui generis -a unique case; that the link made between the micro-level research and macro level questions is theoretically inadequate; that complexity is actually denied as the relationship between the revenue base in an economy and the state form pertaining is complex and context specific, thwarting generalisation; even the conclusions at a micro-level are inconclusive and contradictory, suggesting both a welfarist moment of redistribution of income North to South, and a system which reinforces and exacerbates inequality (see Hansen, 2004 on Somaliland). We will return to some of these in the concluding section.
A second purpose of the second round of surveying was to create some temporal comparisons which might enable us to begin to model the political economy of remittances, and the degree to which this can be taken as a proxy measure for a wider distal political economy of dispossession. To do this we needed data on how the institutions which underpin the sending and receipt of remittances had changed during the year; whether and in what ways institutionalisation within the spatial economy had occurred or remained constant; and how far the individual agents' participant in the exchange had regularised or changed their behaviour. We discuss this further in section 4 below, with reference to some seminal theoretical texts on the concept of a political economy of dispossession, or its related term, displacement. We prefer to use the term 'dispossession', since it reflects the underlying reasons why many migrants moved, even the skilled ones when the professional economy shrunk from 2000 in Zimbabwe, and why remittances remain so important to wellbeing in relation to an economy where the state class systematically disassembles independent accumulation or wealth creation. We conclude that our remittances provide liquidity for a relatively constant political economy of dispossession, whose loci are many, and which has nodal points of exchange dispersed internationally.
As with any case study research, in this second line of enquiry, we encountered the problem of measurement of how far our findings can be viewed as representative of a wider whole: whether the illustrative data can be used to answer, in some part at least, our wider research question of whether remittances illuminate the materiality underlying a particular mode of accumulation, or political economy of dispossession. This requires that our case study remittance research be used to proxy, or map, the 'materialism of everyday life' in our Zimbabwean households. This may be overambitious with our size of sample set, so we limit ourselves to proposing further lines of inquiry which are suggested by the data.
Demographics and household incomes
In some respects the results of the two surveys were very similar. For example a static 50 per cent of our households were in receipt of remittances in both years. In other respects they showed difference, such that the number of remittance receiving households in Mabelreign had reduced substantially. We will review the data from the 2006 survey and comparative results in the next section, before returning to these rather larger suggestions of meaning resulting from reviewing that data.
The mean age of our respondents in 2005 was 37 from a highly varied sample (n=297; sd. 18), while in 2006 this was 38 (n=300; sd = 15). The median age in 2005 was 33, while in 2006 it was also 33. In both sampling exercises the respondents were only identified by alias and suburb, so exact tracing of respondents was not carried out. However, the sampling was carried out in the same suburbs, and the two samples can be seen as relatively comparable by a number of demographics -by age, sex and income. The commensurability of the two surveys by income is a more confused picture. We tried to index link the bands used in the 2005 survey reproduced in the table below, to matched values in 2006. Either this exercise inflated the value of the 2006 incomes, or our sample set had become richer. It might also be the case that remittance income has become regularised such that people include this in their estimates of their household income, whereas in 2005 they did not include it. Additionally, the survey period (October to November 2006) occurred shortly after the revaluation of the ZWD through removing 3 zeroes. This could have affected the calculation of incomes and other receipts, as households struggled with understanding the value of the new money. What had been 1 million ZWD had become 1000 ZWD. However, there seems to be a marked clustering of Bulawayo incomes around a higher average in 2006 than in 2005, and higher than Harare equivalents, which may be related to an increase in remittances received in 2006 in high density Bulawayo. It may also, however, be related to a build up of household assets from an earlier period of remittances, which is difficult to statistically explore when the households are not identical, the time period lapsed in only one year and the sample is relatively small. There are also fewer high density area households included in the 2006 data for Bulawayo than in 2005, who return household data, partly due to the inclusion of Khumalo households in the 2006 set, skewing the whole dataset's incomes upward. The income data by suburb and year is in Table 3 
Receipt of goods and money
The number of households receiving goods or money from relatives who were away was remarkably constant between the years 2005 and 2006 at roughly half. Significant here seems to be the drop in receivers in the low density suburbs of Harare, from 78.4 per cent in 2005, to 42.7 per cent in 2006, which could be because of the maturity of migration demographics, as relatives join the migrant in their new country of domicile. Perhaps wives and children have managed to join them as they accumulate rights and social capital in the new country. Otherwise, this could be interpreted as a forgetful group of migrants who have stopped sending, or a group which illustrates the 'remittances decay hypothesis' observed elsewhere, that remittances decline as time spent away lengthens (Brown and Foster, 1995: 38; see also Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002) . Thus the low density Harare remitters seem to have reduced their gifts, while the high density Bulawayo remitters have increased theirs. Does this mean that the absence of remitters in 2005 in Bulawayo led to higher incomes? Or that the high number of remitters in 2006 means that they have higher incomes? One hypothesis would be that the lower number of remitters in the low density Harare suburbs is due to demographic changes, around the continued emigration of family members. Taking just the sub sample of low density Harare residents the drop off in remitters is large -58 to 32 in 2005 and 2006 respectively -against a fairly constant distribution of household income shares in our banded income brackets. Close relatives transferring money seem to have shrunk, supporting our hypothesis that families may have rejoined. For example, 21 sons and daughters were primary senders in 2005, whereas only 6 sons and daughters were sole senders in 2006, while of 10 mothers or fathers who were sole senders in 2005, only 1 singularly maintained a household in 2006. However, there may also be a bleaker picture here of reduced levels of transfer altogether between relatives that have not rejoined, for example, 3 cousins, 3 aunts and uncles have disappeared to no observations in these categories, while 6 brothers or sisters have reduced to 1. Obviously, these are not the same people, but number of observations in that category of relationship between the receiver and the sender. It is theoretically possible that the drop in the number of sole senders be offset by households receiving money from more than one person. However, this too had dropped: in Harare's low density suburbs in 2005, 29 households claimed to be receiving money from more than one person, but in 2006 this had dropped to only 11 households. However, a closer inspection of the 'other' answers, where respondents record multiple senders and where spouses may be hidden alongside aunts, uncles and so on, shows that a more complex picture pertains, with a rise in households receiving from multiple senders. For example, in 2005 there were 2 siblings mentioned in the other category, making, with those siblings who were sole senders (23) a total of 25 persons; while in 2006 there were only 2 siblings named as sole senders, but a full 31 brothers and sisters mentioned by households receiving from more than one sender, making a total of 33 sibling senders, more than in 2005. However, as table 9 illustrates, in all the other three categories -parent, spouse and child, the total number of senders -those mentioned a primary senders and senders within multiple answers -had dropped. Thus while the 'other' category has risen from 22 to 37 between 2005 and 2006, indicating a rise in multiple answers -that is, in those households with more than one primary sender -the drop in observations of households with a primary sender, in the close relatives' categories, cannot be offset by and increase in multiple numbers of senders who would include these people. In other words, close relatives sending money were fewer overall, even though households had managed to diversify their sources of revenue from those away. This is probably the case of gaining smaller rewards from a greater number of people, in the absence of a primary sender, again suggesting that nuclear family structures may have rejoined elsewhere. Overall, alongside the data suggesting that the regularity of remittances has declined, and monthly receipts are fewer, this demographic assessment would strongly suggest that remittances themselves declined in 2006, perhaps because of the tougher times faced by the remitters themselves. Here, triangulated research with senders as well as receivers would be ideal in order to test this suggestion.
More details of senders and receivers
In our paper on the 2005 data set we pointed to a fairly standardised and widespread pattern of monthly remittances based on migrations of a household head. Between 2005 and 2006, the number of primary senders located in South Africa had risen from 22.7 per cent to 27.8 per cent of senders, but had dropped for the UK from 24.7 per cent to 18.5 per cent of all senders. The increased proportion of remitters based in South Africa as compared to the UK could be a reflection that migration to the former has continued to increase while that to the latter has stabilized.
For Mabelreign, the actual number of senders in the UK had dropped from 23 to 10 persons; was constant for South Africa (8 and 7 respectively); and for high density Harare the number of senders in South Africa had dropped from 17 to 13, but in UK had risen from 6 to 9. In low density Bulawayo the number of senders internationally had also risen for both South Africa, UK and America, although the most significant change between the two years was for the location of senders for high density Bulawayo, where the number in South Africa had risen from 4 to 14. 
The process of sending and exchange in the goods economy
The way in which the household received the last money or goods has some significant changes between 2005 and 2006. In particular, the direct transit of goods with the sender themselves on a visit home had risen from 38.2 per cent to 50 per cent, while the use of persons known to the household had dropped from 34.5 per cent to only 15.8 per cent, suggesting that people were increasingly preferring the means of transit with the most control and security against theft or misadventure. This hypothesis is also supported by a slight increase in people going to fetch the goods.3 The only countervailing trend was an increased use of the post office. 
Importance to the households of the goods sent
The measures of importance to the household begin with whether the item was food which would not otherwise have been consumed, which remained the same between the two years with a not statistically significant change. Similarly, with the measure of clothing importance, there was little change between the two years, suffice to add that in both years households recorded that goods received were of critical importance to them. 
The process of sending and exchange in the money economy
The degree of heightened matching to expressed need for goods sent was matched by a heightened degree of regularisation of money payments sent between 2005 and 2006. When asked whether the receipt of money was regular, 89.1 per cent replied yes in 2006 as compared to 81.7 per cent in 2005. However, the number actually receiving regular and frequent amounts of money seems to have dropped between the two years, showing a potential error in peoples' perception, or indicating that we are correct to assume that the direct circumstances in which the survey was carried out had interrupted that months' flows in an unrepresentative way. Thus the data on when the money was actually received is contradicted when respondents were asked how often money is sent: more said every month than reported actually having received money in the last month. When asked how the sender got the payment to the household, again there was a dramatic drop, as there had been with goods sent, of those using a relative or family friend, suggesting the trust in such relationships had been worn out. The number of senders using bank accounts had also dropped dramatically, and in person exchange had risen accordingly and in compensation. The significant drop in those using formal sector banks, corresponds in some degree to an increase in receivers relying on informal money changers -over 40 per cent of households (see Table 20 below), which includes these 43 per cent who received the money by the person coming home -subsequently used an informal sector money changer. This signifies the ever greater and unrealistic gap between official and parallel rates during the survey period. It also suggests a consolidation of the parallel market compared to earlier years.
When we asked households why the sender had used this method to transfer the money, convenience had dropped relative to safety as the overarching explanation. In the multiple answers given in the 'other' category, the 2006 responses also feature security predominantly, and more so than even in 2005. Most respondents who answered specifically why the sender chooses this method cited exchange rates: the low official rate as compared to the competitive parallel market rate. They had memories of the time when The Government of Zimbabwe closed the Bureau de Change, the Western Union offices and the earlier period when Western Union was only allowed to pay out in local currency. When we asked whether the remitter had always used the particular method given, more than a quarter reported that they had changed their transit mode, suggesting that in a market which relies on trust, people were quite ready, or were forced to, change their behaviour relatively frequently. .5 per cent and 29.8 per cent received in forex for the two years respectively. This suggests that not only were families increasingly not willing to use remote, unknown, or institutional means of conduit, they were also becoming more averse to using those same means to exchange the money into local currency at some point along its transit: whether in transit from a domiciled bank in the UK (forex) to a local business distributor (thus securing along the way the externalisation of local profits from Zim$ to forex); or by using a street level money changer on the way from the airport to home. Instead, they were increasingly taking the foreign exchange with them door to door. Correspondingly, the number of in person transactions carried out in Zim$ dropped from 64. The increase in person transactions is probably also related, however, to the proximity factor (to and from South Africa), given that an increased number of our remitters are more proximate than in the 2005 data set. Communication between remitters is easier (it is a day's journey), and probably regular, while the need for institutions and 'middlemen' reduces commensurately. It is difficult to disaggregate the effects on the mode of transit of the security environment and general economic context, from the demographic and locations of remitters themselves, although the data on how security is cited as a larger determinant suggests that it is not only the logistics of the transit and proximity of South Africa that are in play. Local remittances would also be sensitive to security and trust in transmission, and crime levels show an upward trend. There was also a ban on MTAs during the survey period.
When asked what they did with the money first, an increased number in 2006 (20.4 per cent) reported paying it in to a bank account (as opposed to 6.2 per cent in 2005), although this might be a consequence of more of the money having been received in person in the first instance. It is also perhaps indicative of the surveillance pertaining in the banking sector and the partial criminalisation of remittances, which would undermine the safety of a cross-border deposit, even when the receiver has an actual preference for the money to be in a bank: that is, it would need to be brought into the country clandestinely as foreign exchange, changed into local currency, and then deposited. Of those receiving money in foreign exchange, the mode of exchange into Zim$, by far the most preferred method, was to use a money changer known to the household, which mode had increased from 15.1 per cent to 40. The number of households receiving financial assistance from elsewhere was also constant, although there was a slight observable rise in households receiving assistance from the World Food Programme and Government of Zimbabwe, reflecting deepening poverty, and increased food assistance to urban areas by donors and public authorities.
Interestingly, the 'other' category far exceeds all the others in who is providing this other assistance.
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Wider implications of the data on informality and governance
Poverty reduction, in multi-dimensional terms (see (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Green and Hulme, 2005; Clark, 2005) , has been evidenced by migrant remittance receipt in the data gathered from our survey. However, this must be considered in relation to indirect effects, such as inflation, which occur as a consequence, at least in part, of the informalisation and dollarisation within the economy, which is in turn exacerbated by remittances. Not only are their zimdollar receipts subject to constant devaluation, but remittance receivers have also experienced expulsion and government extortion as a consequence of their positionality in the 'political economy of displacement' (see Hammar and Raftopolous, 2007 , mimeo, for a discussion of this term). In this sense, the quantitative data from our research triangulates the interpretative findings of work from social anthropologists and sociologists on coping and getting by in deleterious governance circumstances (see for example Little, 2003; Trefon, 2005) : that is, that ameliorative networks and social capital are formed, but not without struggle and reaction from the state. Thus, avoiding pressure from the government to surrender receipts into the formal system -and to subsequently lose 9/10th of their potential value at the official exchange rate -does not mean that the market value of remittances stays constant at the parallel rent. They are also subjected to hyper inflation.
A high degree of economic informality was observed in our survey, more than in 2005, and also a considerable degree when compared to other studies. El-Qorchi et al (2003) estimated unofficial transfers of remittances to the developing world at $10 billion per year, but other estimates have ranged from between 35 percent to 250 percent of total remittances (Freud and Spatafora, 2005: 1 The consensus view is that informal remittances to sub-Saharan Africa, encouraged by dual exchange rates, are relatively high (Freud and Spatafora, 2005: 4; Aggarwal and Spatafora, 2005) . Some micro-level field studies have also indicated that informal or inkind transfers are substantial globally (Massey and Parrado, 1994 ; see also Puri and Ritzema, 1999; reviewed in Gammeltoft, 2002) , including in the DRC (Sumata, 2002: 622) , Somalia (Ahmed, 2006) and Zimbabwe (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) . DfID (2002) assert that informal remittances currently represent twice or three times the amount of formally transferred funds globally, which might be conservative relative to the poorest countries, as this case study suggests. Widening disparities between official and unofficial exchange rates in some sub-Saharan African countries, the maturing of international migrant populations and the increase in electronic transfer could all augment these estimates.
The use of informal and formal has been discussed in specialist literature on the (in)formal sector (reviewed by Gёrxhani, 2004) , while the informal sector is also ambiguous in its actual economic effects (Ranis and Stewart, 1999) . The data from Zimbabwe suggests that within the 'informal' category, there was a greater reliance on known persons and relatives, rather than commercial companies, in goods and money transit, suggesting that 'informalisation' can take distinct forms (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006: 24-27 ). These distinct forms in turn relate to the social positioning of recipients, and feed into political economies of corruption, collapse, rentierism and externalisation of funds in failing states. Thus understanding the role of remittances within illiberal states, requires reference to wider cultural norms, embedded institutional practices (see Granovetter, 1985) , within traditional or indigenous sites of reciprocal exchange, as examined, but also essentialised, by Chabal and Deloz (1999; reviewed in MacLean, 2002: 517 -520 : see also Savage and Harvey, 2007) .
Meanwhile, political economy accounts of the roots of nefarious government, the most proximate cause of informalisation, have also been attributed to structural adjustment processes (Harris-White and White, 1996; Szeftel, 1998) which legitimised the accumulation of private wealth (Harrison, 1999: 542-3; Chingono, 1996: 82; on Mozambique: Bracking, 1999; Dansereau et al, 2005; Bond and Manyanya, 2002 , on Zimbabwe) while creating new opportunities for spoils politics (see Allen, 1999 ) through privatisation (see Tangri and Mwenda on Uganda, 2001 ). Rapid and unstable socioeconomic liberalisation has spurred 'boundary politics' exercised "between the national and the global economy; between the public functionary and the citizen" (Harrison, 1999: 537) , where contests over resources have become illiberal and subject to corruption and violence. Research on the effect of remittances within states experiencing nefarious government, where informalisation is ubiquitous, are few, although a recent collection by Savage and Harvey (2007) reviewed the role of remittances in failing states and within humanitarian crises.
However, from these accounts we can deduce that neo-patrimonialism (see Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 458-9 ) does appear to set a precedent for ruling elites to view remittance recipients' money as somehow deserving or belonging to them, the natural patriotic leaders of the nation, such that punitive taxation regimes and spurious taxes are often devised to capture some of the income sent by migrants. In other words, Bayart's pays legal is used to incrementally subvert the poverty reducing potential of private transfers, using the pays reel where real power is wielded (see 2000: 229-230, on the two spheres). Maclean (2002 , citing Clapham, 1998 recently reviewed and applied the 'political economy of conflict' approach to understanding the deterioration of governance in Zimbabwe, arguing that sovereignty provides "access to outside sources of wealth as well as a protective shield behind which the sources and beneficiaries of that wealth could remain obscure" (2002: 517), which in some part explains the ideological defense of the acquisition of remittances by means of state policy. In more extreme cases Allen describes a 'spoils politics' model which can lead to eventual state collapse (1999, 367) , where global marginalisation, citing Duffield, gives "local actors the chance to rework the nature of political authority" (Duffield, 1998: 82) , dislocating it from "conventional territorial, bureaucratic or consent-based structures" (Duffield, 1998: 97) .
Within this more extreme spoils politics model, the capture of private remittances by the political class would be commensurate with the functionality and form of other political relationships with the majority poor. In other words, it would seem like 'common sense' that the Reserve Bank should capture them, even at a derisory official exchange rate. This research has provided evidence for the viability of this spoils politics model in the current context, to explain the mode of governmentality prevailing in Zimbabwe, and the role of remittances in contributing to the funding of that state form. This context undermines the pecuniary value of remittances over time, by reproducing chronic scarcity in goods markets, and by failing the citizens in terms of the welfare prerogatives of liberal government to the poor.
Indeed, there is also a multidimensional political economy relationship between the micro-level remittance economy, and acts of kleptocracy by the ruling elite, because of the sheer magnitude of the former, and the lucrative rents and profits to be found in money changing and money supply in transactional exchange between the informal and formal economy6. Events in late 2007, surrounding a more recent replacement of the money stock, revealed 'cash barons' at the heart of government, while some banks which facilitate parallel market exchange are rumoured to be owned by top officials within the ruling party. These relationships between various social actors have the potential to be successfully modelled within a 'political economy of dispossession' paradigm. The political economy of decline in Zimbabwe (Dansereau and Zamponi, 2005) has a specific historiography, rather than being isomorphic to other states, but there are similarities around the role of internally and internationally displaced people and the remittance economy they create. The dispossession of the rural and urban poor and informal sector traders during the 'land reform' process and Operation Murambatsvina (see Potts, 2006) , has been accompanied by a dispossession of the middle and professional classes caused by economic contraction in the formal economy, to create a political economy where the majority people's dispossession has created economic opportunities for others, the core elite and the party faithful7.
Conclusion
We have explored a small snapshot of change between November 2005 and November 2006 in the remittance economy of Zimbabwe and observed a general decline in the trust required to facilitate remote economic exchange. There was no observable build up of the commercial informal sector during the year, but rather an increase in, and further deepening of the privatisation of economic exchange. It is probable that while both commercial informal sector institutions and familial networks can work relatively autonomously from the state, it is the capture of the former by members of the political class which has pressurised increased recourse into the latter, the more private family networks. There was also some evidence of dollarisation, which again suggests a greater schism between state and society, even since 2005. It is clear from the triangulation from qualitative data collected along with the surveys that informalization in 2006 continued to be affected by the Operation Murambatsvina of 2005. However, while trust may have been affected in relations between remitters and receivers, it may be only tentatively posited as a critical factor given that most respondents in the 2006 survey were not the same as those surveyed in 2005.
We also observed a decline in remittance receipts in the low density suburbs of Harare, an increase in receipts in the high density suburbs of Bulawayo and an increase in remitters in South Africa relative to the UK. The emotional and social effects of loneliness and isolation caused by relatives' absences were still being felt acutely. In general, we suggest that to the extent to which the Zimbabwean economy as a whole is dependent on corporeal, physical and/or material dispossessions -and the resulting assets made available and remittances sent -it can be characterised as a political economy of dispossession. It remains for us to continue to theorize the economic effects of the remittance economy, alongside its political consequences, despite neither of these being methodologically very easy, in order to ensure that the individual sacrifices being made are resulting in the most benefit possible to those left behind, and ultimately to members of the Diaspora as well. In sum, the international remittance network is sponsoring social change alongside its important work of social survival, but of what types and with what consequences remains unclear.
